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DISCRETIONARY RELIEF FROM CONSEQUENCES OF
CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS IN MISSOURI
PART ONE
EARL T. CRAWFORD*
1. METHODS OF SECURING RELIEF
Two general sources exist from which a person convicted of
crime may obtain, in a proper case, complete or partial relief
from the legal consequences of his conviction. First, he may
apply to the trial court. Relief may be awarded to him in several
forms. The court may simply withhold the imposition of sen-
tence; it may suspend its execution, if imposed; it may put the
defendant on probation; or it may grant him a bench parole.'
If the defendant should fail in his efforts to obtain the court's
favorable action on his application for his choice of the above
possible avenues of relief, he may resort, sooner or later, to the
second general source-the action of the chief executive. So far
as this state is concerned, the governor, in his discretion, may
grant him a pardon, either absolute or conditional, put him on
parole, or commute his sentence, absolutely or conditionally, or
give him a reprieve.2
* Member of Missouri State Board of Probation and Parole; member of
the Missouri and Kansas bars; LL.B., Washington Univ., 1928; LL.M.,
Northwestern Univ., 1935.
1. R. S. Mo. 1939, §9156. "The circuit and criminal courts of this state,
the court of criminal correction of the City of St. Louis, and boards of
parole created to serve any such court, may place on probation any de-
fendant eligible for judicial parole under §§4199-4211, inclusive, of Article
18, Chapter 30, R. S. Mo. 1939. After a conviction, or a plea of guilty, the
courts and boards of parole named in this section may suspend the imposi-
tion or execution of sentence of any person legally eligible for judicial parole.
under said §§4199-4211, inclusive, and may also place the defendant oix
probation."
2. Mo. Const. 1875, Art. V, §8.
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In recent years, a third source has come into existence in many
states in the form of the institution known as the parole board.
Such a board was created by statute in Missouri in 1937.3 It
does not, however, except in cases where the guilty person has
been committed to a reformatory for juveniles, 4 have the autho-
rity to award any relief to the applicant. It merely acts as an ad-
visory board to the governor and recommends to him those per-
sons found and deemed proper for parole. But in certain cities
and counties, special parole boards have been created,5 consisting
of the various judges of the courts of criminal jurisdiction and
generally some other official, having the power to grant paroles
to persons convicted of certain offenses in such counties and
cities.6
The Various Methods Distinguished
For obvious reasons, there is no need to point out the differ-
ence between a stay of the imposition of sentence and the sus-
pension of the execution of sentence. The former may be in-
cluded in that form of judicial relief usually designated as pro-
bation, and the latter in that designated as a bench parole.7 Each
3. Mo. Laws, 1937, p. 400, §5, now R. S. Mo. 1939 §9160. Prior to the
enactment of this law, the State Prison Board had the power to investigate,
hear and recommend inmates to the Governor for parole. Laws, 1917, p.
155. And before the creation of the prison board, the law provided for a
pardon attorney, who should examine, index, and report to the Governor
on all applications for pardons submitted to him by the Governor. Laws
1901, p. 178.
4. See R. S. Mo. 1939, §9157, vesting in such board the powers and duties
relative to paroles, commutations of sentence, pardons and reprieves which
were previously vested in the commissioners of the department of penal
institutions and the Intermediate Reformatory Parole Board. While the
statutes vesting the power of parole and commutation, etc. in the depart-
ment of penal institutions were not re-enacted when the present parole
board was created, they are nevertheless still effective because of the lan-
guage of §9157, and are as follows: R. S. Mo. 1929, §8369, (State Indus-
trial Home for Girls); R. S. Mo. 1929, §8382, (State Industrial Home for
Negro Girls); and R. S. Mo. 1929, §8353, (The Missouri Training School
for Boys).
5. In circuits of one county, having a city of 300,000 to 600,000 inhabi-
tants, such board consists of the prosecuting attorney and the several judges
-of the circuit court. R. S. Mo. 1939, §9170. In circuits of one county, hav-
ing a city of 75,000 to 200,000 inhabitants, the board consists of the judge
or judges of the circuit court of said county and the sheriff. R. S. Mo.
1939, §9175. And in circuits composed of only one county, having 60,000
to 200,000 inhabitants, and no city of the first class, the parole board con-
sists of the judges of the circuit court of such county. R. S. Mo. 1939,
§9175.
6. For the power of such boards to parole, See R. S. Mo. 1939, §§4199-
4211, inclusive.
7. See note 15, infra. Also, see State v. Abbott (1911) 87 S. C. 466,
70 S. E. 6. That probation is the postponement of final judgment or sen-
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is a means by which the defendant is given another chance, so
long as he will abide by the terms and conditions upon which
the court withholds the infliction of the lawful punishment pre-
scribed for the crime he has committed. Technically speaking,
however, since a parole is a conditional pardon,8 the designation
of the relief afforded by the court as a "parole" is a misnomer,
although for all practical purposes, the action of the court in
granting the defendant freedom from punishment pending good
behavior, may well be designated as a "judicial parole," 9 in con-
tradistinction to paroles granted by the chief executive. Yet the
judicial parole, if the imposition of sentence is stayed or post-
poned, in its ultimate effect amounts simply to probation. It is,
therefore, apparent that there is considerable confusion con-
cerning the distinction between paroles by the court and proba-
tion. While similar in many ways, technically, they are different.
A parole, for one thing, presupposes a preliminary period of in-
carceration before the offender is released under supervision,
while a person placed on probation may never have been im-
prisoned.
A pardon, a parole, a commutation of sentence, and a reprieve
are all acts of grace proceeding from the governor. The former
is an act which exempts the individual to whom it is granted,
from the punishment which the law inflicts for the crime he has
committed.'0 A parole is a form of conditional pardon, by which
the convict is released before the expiration of his sentence, to
remain subject during the remainder thereof to the supervision
of the public authority and to be returned to imprisonment upon
the violation of the condition of his release." On the other hand,
a commutation is the substitution of a lower for a higher grade
of punishment,12 and a reprieve is the withdrawing of a sentence
tence in a criminal case, giving the offender an opportunity to improve his
conduct and to re-adjust himself to the community, often on conditions
imposed by the court and under the guidance and supervision of the court,
see II Attorney General's Survey of Release Procedures, p. 1 (Dept. of
Justice, 1989).
8. See note 11, infra.
9. R. S. Mo. 1939 §9156, speaks of "judicial paroles"; so does R. S. Mo.
1939 §4199.
10. State v. Asher (Mo. 1922) 246 S. W. 911; also, see Lime v. Blagg
(1939) 345 Mo. 1, 131 S. W. (2d) 583, and Hughes v. State Board of
Health (Mo. 1942) 159 S. W. (2d) 277.
11. State v. Asher (Mo. 1922) 246 S. W. 911.
12. Ex parte Webbe (Mo. 1929), 30 S. W. (2d) 612, Lime v. Blagg
(1939) 345 Mo. 1, 131 S. W. (2d) 583.
1942l
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for an interval of time, whereby its execution is suspended. The
ultimate execution of the sentence and judgment of the court is
not abrogated in case of a reprieve but merely delayed.13 A
pardon wipes the sentence out completely so far as punishment
is concerned, while a parole is simply the release of the convict
from the punishment so long as he fulfills the conditions attached,
and it in no way destroys the sentence. Because of the practice
of granting pardons and commutations on condition, actually
there is little real difference between either form of relief and
a parole. Basically, each is an executive order.
Historical Origins of the Methods
The courts of general criminal jurisdiction, under the early
common law, exercised the power to suspend sentences. This
practice seems to have had its origin in an effort by the English
courts to relieve the defendant from the hardships resulting from
the peculiar rules of criminal procedure prevailing under the com-
mon law when the court had no power to grant a new trial and
the verdict was not reviewable on the facts by a higher court.1
Similarly, it would also appear that the early English courts had
the power not only to suspend sentence but also to stay the exe-
cution thereof, although this latter power may have been the
result of early statutes. Out of the exercise of these two powers
grew the modern practice known as probation, and the judicial
or bench parole.15
In England, from time immemorial, the pardoning power has
been exercised by the king, and such power has always been
regarded as a necessary attribute of sovereignty. 6 And, to go
a step further, the remission of guilt has likewise been regarded
as an attribute of the Deity; consequently, since the king claimed
the right to rule by divine appointment, the exercise of this at-
tribute of the Deity came about logically. With the formation of
the state governments in America, it was a natural step to vest
the pardoning power in the governor. Out of this power arises
the power of parole, commutation, and reprieve.
13. Lime v. Blagg (1939) 345 Mo. 1, 131 S. W. (2d) 583.
14. 15 Am. Juris. 135, §480.
15. See II Attorney General's Survey of Release Procedures (Dept. of
Justice, 1939), p. 3.
16. Jamison v. Flanner (1924) 116 Kan. 624, 228 Pac. 82, 35 A. L. R.
421. Also, see State v. Woolery (1860) 29 Mo. 300.
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Sources of the Power to Award Relief
(a) The Governor. By virtue of the constitution of Missouri, 7
the governor of the state is expressly given the power to grant
reprieves, commutations and pardons, after conviction, 18 for all
offenses, except treason and cases of impeachment, upon such
conditions and with such restrictions and limitations as he may
think proper, subject to such regulations as may be provided by
law relative to the manner of applying for pardons. And the
legislature has, by a superfluous statute, also attempted to vest
the pardoning power in the governor in all cases in which he is
authorized by the constitution "to grant pardons" with such con-
ditions and under such restrictions as he may think proper. 19
No provision will be found in the constitution expressly grant-
ing to the governor the power to parole. It has, however, been
held by the courts that a parole is a conditional pardon,20 and
that the granting of a parole by the governor is merely the exer-
cise of the power vested in him by the constitution with respect
to the issuance of conditional pardons.21 This conclusion was
reached where an information was filed, alleging that the de-
fendant "was duly discharged from said penitentiary of the state
of Missouri under parole of the governor," whereas the Habitual
Criminal Act 22 under which the defendant was charged, used the
words "shall be discharged either upon pardon or upon compli-
ance with the sentence" in speaking of a prior conviction. 23 The
court rejected the argument in this case that the information was
defective because the word "parole" was used instead of the word
"pardon" and accordingly held that the power to pardon included
the power to parole.
The power to grant a parole may also be supported by the
constitutional power of the governor to grant conditional par-
17. Const. 1875, Art. V. §8. Also, see State v. Woolery (1860) 29 Mo.
800; Ex parte Collins (1887) 94 Mo. 22; Jacobs v. Crawford (1925) 308
Mo. 302, 272 S. W. 931. This power was originally vested in the governor
by Art. IV, §6, Const. 1820, and then by Art. V, §6, Const. 1865.
18. "After conviction" means after the return of a verdict of guilty.
Ex parte Collins (1887) 94 Mo. 22.
19. R. S. Mo. 1939, §4188.
20. State v. Asher (Mo. 1922), 246 S. W. 911, quoting 29 Cyc. 1562.
That a parole is not a form of conditional pardon, see Weihofen, Consoli-
dation of Pardon and Parole: A Wrong Approach (1940) 30 Jour. Crim.
Law and Crimin. 534.
21. State v. Asher (Mo. 1922) 246 S. W. 911.
22. R. S. Mo. 1919, §3702 now R. S. Mo. 1939, §4854.
23. State v. Asher (Mo. 1922) 246 S. W. 911.
1942]
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dons and commutations 2 4 Basically, there is little or no differ-
ence between these three methods of executive clemency. Each
is fundamentally the granting of leniency upon condition by an
executive order, whether such order be called a pardon, a parole
or a commutation.
(b) The Courts.-The pardoning power belongs exclusively to
the executive department of the state government.25 The reason
for this rule is found in the nature of our governmental system.
2 1
Consequently, it is not within the power of the trial court to
suspend its sentence indefinitely or to order an indefinite stay of
execution, if sentence be already imposed.27 The recognition of
24. Mo. Const. (1875) Art. V, §8. Most conditional commutations are
now granted under what is generally referred to as the seven-twelfths rule,
under which a period of seven months is considered as one year on the
inmate's sentence for commutation purposes. The following is a brief state-
ment of the rule's origin: "In 1918 the number of inmates in the peniten-
tiary became so great that adequate housing facilities for the care and
custody of these inmates was a tremendous problem. In order to alleviate
this condition it was agreed between the Governor and the members of the
Penal Board, who at that time served as the Parole Board, that all inmates
who conducted themselves properly in the institution would be granted a
merit release, after having served seven-twelfths of their sentence.
This practice was continued until June, 1930, at which time instead of
granting an outright release there were certain conditions imposed upon
those released by this method. Failure on the part of the subjects to comply
with the imposed conditions resulted in the revocation of their commutation
and their return to the penitentiary. This method of automatically releas-
ing prisoners after they had served seven-twelfths of their sentence con-
tinued until January 10, 1939. On that date the members of the Penal
Board, the members of the Board of Probation and Parole, in joint session
with Honorable Lloyd C. Stark, Governor of Missouri, approved and adopted
the following changes and rules and regulations governing the release of
inmates from the Missouri State Penitentiary on conditional commutation:
1. Any person or persons who is now or may hereafter be incarcerated
in the Missouri State Penitentiary, having been convicted, sentenced and
committed for the crime of Rape, Kidnapping, Murder, Driving while Intox-
icated, or Stealing Livestock, shall not be granted automatic release on
conditional commutation after having served seven-twelfths of his sentence,
less the additional time allowed by the Penal Board for good behavior and
farm time, but that person must be heard and recommended for release by
the Board of Probation and Parole, and said release approved by the
Governor.
2. Any person or persons who is now or may hereafter be incarcerated
in the Missouri State Penitentiary, having been previously convicted of two
or more felonies, shall not be granted an automatic release on conditional
commutation, * * * but that person must be heard and recommended for
release by the Board of Probation, and said recommendation approved by
the Governor." See Report of Board of Probation and Parole, State of
Missouri, for September 6, 1937, to December 31, 1940, pages 31-33, in-
clusive.
25. State v. Grant (1883) 79 Mo. 113.
26. State v. Grant (1883) 79 Mo. 113; Ex parte Thornberry (1923)
300 Mo. 661, 254 S. W. 1087.
27. Ex parte Cornwall (1909) 223 Mo. 259, 122 S. W. 666, Ex parte
Brown (Mo. App. 1927) 297 S. W. 445.
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this power in the court would violate the basic principle of our
government and allow the court to exercise the pardoning
power,'2 8 for, at least in the absence of an enabling statute, a
court's power in the administration of the criminal law is limited
to the imposition of the sentence upon the conviction of the ac-
cused. Hence, the trial court could not, for example, incorporate
in its judgment the provision that a stay of execution would be
granted until six o'clock of the afternoon of the day on which
sentence was rendered and that if the defendant should be found
in the county thereafter, he should be committed to the peni-
tentiary pursuant to the sentence theretofore passed. 29
In this connection, it is interesting to note that in most, if not
all jurisdictions, the criminal courts of general jurisdiction pos-
sess the inherent power to suspend sentence for a definite period
that is, for a reasonable period of time. Some sanction the sus-
pension of sentences for an indefinite time, but Missouri does not
fall within this category.
The courts in Missouri are expressly authorized to grant judi-
cial paroles, place persons on probation, or suspend the imposi-
tion or execution of sentence. For instance, one statute gives to
the circuit and criminal courts of this state, and the court of
criminal correction of the city of St. Louis, the power to parole
persons convicted of a violation of the criminal laws of this
state.30 Another statutes gives the judge of the juvenile court
the power to suspend the execution of sentence in cases of de-
linquent children.31 And, as we have previously pointed out,3 2
the circuit and criminal courts and the court of criminal correc-
tion for St. Louis are given statutory authorization to place de-
fendants on probation or suspend the imposition or execution of
sentence.23 Yet none of these legislative grants of the authority
to suspend punishment contains a limitation as to the length of
the suspensory period. One may venture the conjecture that the
28. Ex parte Thornberry (1923) 300 Mo. 661, 254 S. W. 1087. Also see
State ex rel Browning v. Kelly (1925) 309 Mo. 465, 274 S. W. 731; State v.
Hockett (1908) 129 Mo. App. 639, 108 S. W. 599.
29. Ex parte Thornberry (1923) 300 Mo. 661, 254 S. W. 1087. Also, see
Ex parte Bugg (1912) 163 Mo. App. 44, 145 S. W. 831.
30. R. S. Mo. 1939 §4199; also, see R. S. Mo. 1939 §4200, which forbids
more than two paroles to the same person under the same judgment.
31. R. S. Mo. 1939 §9680, (applying to juvenile courts in counties of
50,000 or over.)
32. See note 1, supra.
83. R. S. Mo. 1939 §9156.
1942]
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legislature, in order to meet the legal objection to an indefinite
stay of imposition or execution of sentence, enacted the statute
fixing a period beyond which no judicial parole shall be con-
tinued.34 This statute would seem sufficient to remove any form
of judicial relief which withholds the execution of sentence,
whether it be a parole or a stay of execution, from susceptibility
to the charge of infringement upon the pardoning power of the
chief executive, where the stay is for an indefinite period of time.
In other words, by limiting in this manner the parole or proba-
tionary period, the suspension of sentence or punishment, as a
matter fact, cannot be of indefinite duration, even though the
court places no termination date in its order of suspension. But,
the enactment of the statutes vesting the power of judicial parole,
of probation, of suspension of sentence or the stay of the execu-
tion thereof, in the courts, should be of itself sufficient to give
them the power to award all the relief commonly attached to such
forms of relief and consequently confer upon them the power to
relieve the defendant indefinitely from the lawful punishment
prescribed for his offense.
If the power to suspend sentence indefinitely is denied to courts
of general criminal jurisdiction on the constitutional ground that
to recognize the existence of such power as inherent in them
would result in the exercise of executive power by the judiciary,
the same reasoning would also seem applicable to any legislative
effort to confer the power on the courts by statutory enactment;
or, stated in another manner, such an attempt to confer the
authority on the courts by statute would equally constitute an
usurpation of the pardoning power by the legislature and the
statute would be unconstitutional.3 5 Such a result, however, thus
34. R. S. Mo. 1939 §4207. "No person paroled under the provisions of
section 4200 of this article shall be granted an absolute discharge at an
earlier period than six months after the date of his parole, nor shall such
parole be continued for a longer period than two years from date of parole;
but if he shall have been the second time paroled the time shall be counted
from date of second parole. No person paroled under the provisions of
section 4203 of this article shall be granted an absolute discharge at an
earlier period than two years from date of his parole, nor shall such parole
continue for a longer period than ten years: Provided, that if no absolute
discharge shall be granted, nor the parole terminated within the time in
this section limited, it shall be the duty of the court at the first regular
term after the expiration of such time to either grant an absolute discharge
or terminate the parole and order the judgment or sentence to be complied
with, but if the court shall fail to take any action at such time, such failure
to act shall operate as a discharge of the person paroled."
35. Vinson v. State (1918) 16 Ala. App. 536, 79 So. 316, State ex rel.
Payne v. Anderson (1921) 43 S. D. 630, 181 N. W. 839, State ex rel.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol28/iss1/1
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far, does not seem to have occurred in Missouri, and the statutory
authorization apparently is sufficient, as indicated by the lan-
guage of the Court in one case,36 to overcome the alleged lack of
inherent power to grant indefinite suspensions of sentence.
The question has arisen whether a special judge could grant
a parole in a case tried before him. In answering the inquiry,
the supreme court stated that such a judge could pass on a mo-
tion for a new trial, grant an appeal, and settle the bill of excep-
tions, because such matters, being but procedural steps taken in
arriving at the ultimate determination of defendant's guilt or
innocence, are so related to the trial of the cause as to be deemed
incident thereto; but it held that the granting of a parole had
nothing to do with the ascertaining of guilt or innocence, because
a parole presupposes the defendant's guilt. Moreover, by virtue
of statute, an application for parole cannot be entertained until
after a judgment of conviction has been rendered, and that judg-
ment has become a finality. The granting of a parole, therefore,
whether it be deemed a conditional suspension of sentence or a
conditional pardon is no part of the trial of a cause, which cul-
minates in a judgment of conviction,3 7 nor is it incident thereto.
As a result, the court held that no appeal lay from the judgment
entered in this case on the pleas of guilty by the defendants.
When the judge rendered judgment, his power and duties as a
special judge ended and he could not thereafter parole the de-
fendants."8
The trial court loses its power to grant a parole, in a felony
case, on affirmance of the judgment by the supreme court.39 This
is because the supreme court is by statute directed to have its
Hallanan v. Thompson (1917) 80 W. Va. 698, 93 S. E. 810. Contra: People
v. Stickle (1909) 156 Mich. 557, 121 N. W. 497, 499. ("It has never been
supposed that the power of courts to suspend sentence was other than a
judicial function.")
86. See Ex parte Bugg (1912) 163 Mo. App. 44, 145 S. W. 831, 832:
"and to our mind it is clear, in the absence of a statute authorizing it, to
permit a court after judgment is pronounced to indefinitely postpone its
execution is in effect to permit the court to usurp the pardoning power--"
87. State ex rel. Browning v. Kelly (1925) 309 Mo. 465, 274 S. W. 731;
State ex rel. Gentry v. Montgomery (1927) 317 Mo. 811, 297 S. W. 30.
88. State ex rel. Browning v. Kelly (1925) 309 Mo. 465, 274 S. W. 731.
89. R. S. Mo. 1939 §4211. "No parole shall be granted in any case where
an appeal is pending, nor shall the action of any court or judge in granting
or terminating a parole be subject to review by any appellate court." The
trial court, may, however, parole the defendant after the appellate court
affirms his conviction and orders execution of the judgment, in misdemeanor
cases. State ex rel. Gentry v. Montgomery (1927) 317 Mo. 811, 297 S. W. 30.
19421
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marshal execute the sentence, and the supreme court having no
authority to grant a parole, must execute the sentence according
to the punishment assessed on the trial of the case. The court
rejected the argument that the statute prohibiting paroles pend-
ing an appeal gave it the implied power to grant a parole after
the appeal had been decided, on the ground that such a construc-
tion would curtail by implication the statute fixing its duties in
regard to the execution of judgment. 40
May the judge of a trial court, in vacation, grant paroles? In
construing a statute which contained the words "the court before
whom the conviction was had . .. may in his discretion, by
order of record, parole such person," the supreme court held
that the word "court" was used in the sense of "judge," but that
it was also plain that under this section, "the judge before whom
the conviction was had" is not authorized in vacation to parole
the defendant, but only while sitting as a court.41
(c) The Legislature.-The pardoning power cannot be exer-
cised by the legislature.' 2 A statute providing that all persons
in the state, who were under indictment for a violation of the
act to regulate dramshops committed prior to a specified date,
should be released from prosecution therefor, provided certain
costs were paid, was held to be an unconstitutional exercise of
the pardoning power. The court stated, in reaching its decision,
that to sustain such a statute would be to permit the legislature
to usurp an executive function. 4 3 Again, a statute which pur-
ported retroactively to restore civil rights lost on account of a
criminal conviction, 4" was held ineffective as to rights lost before
40. Ex parte Foister (1907) 203 Mo. 687, 102 S. W. 542.
41. State ex rel. Browning v. Kelly (1925) 309 Mo. 465, 274 S. W. 731.
But note R. S. Mo. 1939 §4200, that the court "or the judge thereof in
vacation" may grant the defendant a parole where a jail sentence has been
imposed by the Court or a justice of the peace or he has been sentenced
to a juvenile reformatory.
42. State v. Sloss (1857) 25 Mo. 291; State v. Todd (1858) 26 Mo. 175;
State v. Grant (1883) 79 Mo. 113.
43. "Where is the warrant in the constitution for the general assembly
to direct what disposition shall be made of causes pending in the courts?
Is not the exercise of such a power a judicial function? The governor can
pardon both before and after conviction. His pardon before conviction be-
ing pleaded would be a defense to the accusation. Here is a prosecution
pending in court and the legislature comes in and orders the party to be
released from it. What is that in effect but entering a judgment of ac-
quittal?" State v. Sloss (1857) 25 Mo. 291, 295. But note the provision
in the existing constitution of the state that the pardoning power can be
exercised only after conviction. See note 18, supra.
44. State v. Grant (1883) 79 Mo. 113.
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its passage. The court assumed that the disabilities annexed to
the conviction of the crime of petty larceny formed a part of the
punishment, and also, consequently, a part of the judgment.
Since the Missouri Constitution forbids one department of the
government to exercise any power properly belonging to either
of the others, the court reasoned that any act of the legislature
professedly remitting a portion of the judgment, by relieving the
convict of one of the disabilities incurred, cannot be sustained,
as it is a clear encroachment upon the power of the governor to
pardon. 4 5 If the legislature could remit any portion of the sen-
tence or judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction, there
would be no obstacle to the remission of the whole sentence, as
the difference is only in degree and not in kind. The court, in
this case, further stated that even if the disabilities were not a
part of the judgment, the result would not be altered, if it were
true that nothing short of a full pardon or a reversal of the
judgment could restore the convict to that which he has lost.
The deprivation of all civil rights is a punishment of great sever-
ity, which but for the judgment, would not and could not have
been inflicted. If then, the act of the legislature relieves the
convict of a part of the punishment, it is pro tanto, a judgment
of acquittal or -pro tanto, a pardon, both of which are outside the
legislative domain. The assertion of power on the part of the
law-making branch of the government to abate any part of the
punishment which the court had previously inflicted, is neces-
sarily and logically an assertion of the power to abate the entire
punishment or to absolve the party from all the consequences of
the judgment.
(d) Parole Boards.-We have already indicated that certain
parole boards have been created by statute in this state and
45. "I take it that when the statutes annex certain disabilities, the loss
of certain civil rights, to the conviction of a crime, and a conviction of
that crime thereafter occurs, that thereupon by force and operation of the
law and of the judgment of conviction, the disabilities become welded to
the crime, forming thereby an indivisible integer incapable of separation
by any exertion of the legislative power. And this is especially true under
a constitution such as ours. The position here taken is plainly this: That
the pardoning power is vested by our constitution alone in the governor;
that aside from the reversal of the judgment in a criminal cause, the only
method of relief from the disabilities annexed to such judgment is by a
full pardon of the offense, and that, while the crime itself remains un-,
pardoned, the disabilities annexed thereto will remain unaltered and un-
affected by any legislative act." State v. Grant (1883) 79 Mo. 113, 124.
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vested with the power to parole.41 The state board, however, is
purely an advisory board4 7 except so far as the juvenile reforma-
tories are concerned. 4 8 The local boards, on the other hand, can
actually parole. 49
The power vested in the state board with reference to the
juvenile prisoners confined in the Boys Training School, is not
designated as the power to parole. It is rather the power to give
the offender a temporary release from confinement, so long as
he conducts himself properly 0 For all practical purposes, how-
ever, it is difficult to distinguish this relief from a parole. As to
the inmates of the State Industrial Home for Girls, 51 and the
State Industrial Home for Negro Girls,5 2 the power to parole is
expressly granted.
II. THE GRANTING OF RELIEF
As a Vested Right of the Prisoner
The right to a pardon or a commutation is not a vested one,
which the convict can demand, but, on the contrary, is a mere
46. See note 5, supra.
47. "The Board of Probation and Parole shall have authority and it
shall be its duty to study prisoners committed to State correctional institu-
tions and penal institutions to select prisoners to be recommended to the
Governor for parole, commutation of sentence, or pardon; to provide for
applications for paroles, commutations of sentence, and pardons; to investi-
gate the merits of such application; to make recommendations to the Gov-
ernor relative to paroles, commutations of sentence, and pardons; to recom-
mend conditions deemed advisable in the case of prisoners whose release
on parole, commutation of sentence, or conditional pardon is recommended;
.. The Board may adopt rules and regulations relative to the eligi-
bility of prisoners for parole. The Board of Probation and Parole may,
at the written request of the judge or judges of a court named in Section
1 of this Act, or a board of parole authorized to serve such court, authorize
parole officers appointed by said Board to act as probation officers for
such court or board of parole." R. S. Mo. 1939 §9160.
48. See note 4, supra.
49. See note 6, supra.
50. R. S. Mo. 1929 §8353, continued by reference by R. S. Mo. 1939 §9157.
51. R. S. Mo. 1929 §8369. "Said board may, whenever they deem any of
the inmates of said home, who have been so far reformed as to justify her
discharge, liberate such inmate by dismissal, upon parole, or release her to
any suitable person who will bind her in household work or in some proper
art or trade, or said board may return said girl to her parents or other
guardian, if they are of good moral character, or said board may place any
such girl in the charge and care of any resident of this state, who is the
head of a family and of good moral character, on such conditions and on
such terms as the board may prescribe." This power is vested now in the
parole board by virtue of R. S. Mo. 1939 §9157.
52. R. S. Mo. 1929 §8382, whose provisions are identical with those set
forth in 51. supra.
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matter of grace.5 3 So far as he is concerned, it is a favor which
may be granted to him or withheld, in the discretion of the donor.
This is equally true of judicial paroles54 and the granting of pro-
bation by the court.55
Further indication that the pardoning power of the governor
is not a power which the convict may compel him to exercise
will be found in the fact that the power of the governor to par-
don is not without restriction. For instance, the constitution of
the state expressly forbids its exercise in cases of treason and
impeachment, and gives the legislature the power to set up regu-
lations pertaining "to the manner of applying for pardons" for
other offenses. 56 In this connection, it might be suggested that
the legislative power to regulate the manner of applying for
pardons may relate to pardons only and not to reprieves and
commutations, as all three powers are expressly vested in the
governor but only pardons are made subject to legislative regu-
lation. An attempt is also made by statute to restrict the con-
sideration of persons confined in the Intermediate Reformatory
for Young Men, to those who have served seven-twelfths of their
sentence, in an orderly and peaceable manner. It is also required
that the convict shall have given evidence that he is fit to be
paroled into the life of the community, and that arrangements
have been made for his honorable and useful employment for
at least six months in some suitable occupation and for a suit-
able home free from criminal influences, without expense to the
state. 17 Such a statute may, however, be suspected of being un-
53. Ex parte Reno (1877) 66 Mo. 266; Lime v. Blagg (1939) 345 Mo.
1, 131 S. W. (2d) 583. But note this language from Biddle v. Perovich
(1927) 274 U. S. 480: "A pardon in our day is not a private act of grace
from an individual happening to possess power. It is a part of the con-
stitutional scheme. When granted it is the determination of the ultimate
authority that the public welfare will be better served by inflicting less than
the judgment fixed. See Ex parte Grossman (1925) 267 U. S. 87, 120, 121.
Just as the original punishment would be imposed without regard to the
prisoner's consent and in the teeth of his will, whether he liked it or not,
the public welfare, not his consent determines what shall be done."
54. State v. Collins (1910) 225 Mo. 633, 125 S. W. 465. Also, note the
provisions of R. S. Mo. 1939 §§4200, 4201.
55. "However, it must be pointed out that while probation is almost uni-
versally a matter of judicial discretion, parole, in most instances, is not
so intimately connected with the courts." II Attorney General's Survey of
Release Procedures (Department of Justice-1939) p. 2.
56. Mo. Const. 1875, Art. V, §5. Note, however, the language in Ex parte
Webbe (Mo. 1929) 30 S. W. (2d) 612, quoting 20 R. C. L. 530, that "the
power to commute a sentence is a part of the pardoning power and may be
exercised under a general grant of that power."
57. R. S. Mo. 1929 §9120.
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constitutional as an encroachment upon the power of the gover-
nor to grant pardons and commutations on such conditions as
he may deem proper, unless the constitutional provision relating
to the right of the legislature to regulate the manner of applying
for paroles be considered as supporting the statute now in ques-
tion. Nevertheless, it seems very doubtful that this statute simply
regulates the manner of application rather than the power of
pardon itself.
Crimes and Persons Included
The governor of Missouri can pardon only those persons who
have been convicted of a violation of the law of Missouri; con-
sequently he cannot issue a pardon relieving the convicted per-
son from the consequences of the violation of a city ordinance.
This result was reached by the court after considering the term
"offenses" as used in the Missouri Constitution, 8 in the light of
its context. The fact that the section which confers the pardon-
ing power also requires the governor to communicate to the gen-
eral assembly every act of his under such section, stating the
name of the convict, etc., clearly indicates that the framers of
the constitution had in mind only offenses against the state law."
It is also apparent that a statute authorizing the courts to
parole "persons" convicted of crime does not include corpora-
tions.60 The correctness of this construction appears from the
purpose of the parole law-to place the individual criminal under
the supervision of the court, to the end that a good citizen might
be made of him. Further indication that the parole laws refer
to natural persons, who can be incarcerated in the jail or peni-
tentiary, and not to artificial citizens, which can only respond
by a fine, will be found in the language used in the statute itself
which authorizes a person convicted to go at large in specified
instances.61
Nor is the power of the courts to grant paroles applicable to,
all offenses. By statute,82 certain crimes are excluded, as well as.
certain persons. Murder, forcible rape, arson, and robbery are
58. Mo. Const. 1875, Art. V, §8.
59. State ex rel. City of Kansas City v. Renick (1900) 157 Mo. 292, 57
S. W. 713.
60. Ibid.
61. State ex rel. Howell County v. West Plains Tel. Co. (1911) 232 Mo.
579, 135 S. W. 20.
62. R. S. Mo. 1939 §4201.
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offenses for which the court cannot grant what the statute desig-
nates as a parole. This same statute limits the court's favorable
action to persons of "previous good character and who shall not
have been previously convicted of a felony," and further provides
that the "court shall have no power to parole any person after
he has been delivered to the warden." These limitations as to
persons eligible for parole by the courts are also applicable to the
local boards of parole existing in some counties.63 But one might
well wonder whether the power of a court to put the defendant
on probation is subject to the aforesaid limitation, since the
statute expressly limits only the power of the court to grant
pxroles. The general lack of technical accuracy and the common
practice of referring to all the relief afforded by the trial court
as a parole, however, might be a sufficient reason for holding
that the statute applies equally to probation.
Provisions as to Physical and Mental Condition, Sex, and Age
Even though the governor can grant paroles on any condition
which may seem advisable to him, including a parole terminable
upon a restoration to good health,4 under his constitutional
power to pardon,65 the legislature has authorized him by statute
to grant paroles to convicts "afflicted with any disease which is
of such a character as to be incurable, or where such confinement
will necessarily greatly endanger or shorten the life of such con-
vict." 6 This same statute prescribes, however, that before the
governor exercises the discretionary power to grant a parole
therein given him, the physician shall certify the facts to the
parole board, stating the nature of the disease, and the board
shall then make such endorsement thereon as the nature of the
case requires, and the certificate with the board's endorsement
thereon shall be laid before the governor.
Mental and physical conditions may also be factors justifying
relief from the execution of the court's judgment or sentence.
It is expressly provided by statute67 that, if any person, after
having been convicted of any crime or misdemeanor, become in-
sane before execution or expiration of the sentence of the court,
63. See note 1, supra.
64. See Lime v. Blagg (1939) 345 Mo. 1, 131 S. W. (2d) 583.
65. See note 17, supra.
66. R. S. Mo. 1939, §9076, applying to the penitentiary; R. S. Mo. 1939§9138, applying to the Intermediate Reformatory for Young Men.
67. R. S. Mo. 1939 §4191.
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the governor shall inquire into the facts, and pardon such luna-
tic, or commute or suspend, for the time being, the execution of
such sentence. It is further provided that by his warrant to the
sheriff of the proper county, or the warden of the penitentiary,
he shall order such lunatic conveyed to the hospital for the care
and treatment of the insane, and to be kept there until restored
to his reason. If the sentence of such lunatic is only suspended,
it must be executed upon him after such period has expired.
Further provision is also made by statute 8 that, if, after any
convict be sentenced to death, the sheriff or warden having
charge of his person, has cause to believe that such convict has
become insane, such officer may summon a jury to inquire into
such insanity. If it be found that the convict is insane, the exe-
cution of the sentence is suspended until the officer in charge of
such convict receives a warrant from the governor, or from the
supreme court or other court directing the execution of such con-
vict.6o The jury's finding must be forthwith transmitted to the
governor, who, as soon as he shall be convinced of the sanity
of the convict, may issue a warrant appointing the time of exe-
cution, pursuant to the sentence; or, he may, in his discretion,
commute the punishment to imprisonment for life.70
Pregnancy is also a ground for awarding relief from the im-
mediate execution of sentence where the female is under sentence
of death. In such a case, if the officer having charge of her per-
son has reason to suspect pregnancy, he must summon a jury of
six persons, not less than three of whom are physicians,71 and
if it appear that such female convict is pregnant with child, her
execution is suspended and the inquisition transmitted to the
governor.7 2 However, when the governor is satisfied that the
cause of such suspension no longer exists, he may issue his war-
rant appointing a day for execution of her sentence, or he may,
in his discretion, commute her punishment to life imprisonment."3
Conditions Attached-Legality
As we have elsewhere indicated' 4 the governor can, by virtue
of the state constitution, grant reprieves, commutations, pardons,
68. R. S. Mo. 1939 §4192.
69. R. S. Mo. 1939 §4194.
70. R. S. Mo. 1939 §4195.
71. R. S. Mo. 1939 §4196.
72. R. S. Mo. 1939 §4197.
73. R. S. Mo. 1939 §4198.
74. See note 18, supra.
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and paroles, upon such conditions and with such restrictions and
limitations as he may think proper.75 This power is also extended
to the chief executive by statute,6 although, obviously, it would
seem that such a statute is unnecessary and neither adds to nor
detracts from the power vested in him by the constitutional
grant.77 The courts have recognized that the governor can com-
mute and parole upon condition, and that he may attach to a
commutation or a parole granted by him, any condition he
chooses, provided the condition is not illegal, immoral, or impos-
sible of fulfillment78 Accordingly, a commutation of a term in
the state penitentiary to a term in the reformatory at Boonville,
conditioned that the inmate should comply with all the rules
and regulations of that reformatory and providing that other-
wise the superintendent should return him to the penitentiary,
was upheld as being neither illegal, immoral, nor impossible of
performance. 7 9 The same conclusion was reached by the court
where a parole contained as one of its conditions the provision
that, if the prisoner failed to meet the various conditions thereby
imposed, "he may be arrested and returned to the penitentiary
there to serve out the remainder of his sentence." 80 In this case,
after the parole had been revoked, the prisoner sought release
by a writ of habeas corpus and contended that the time that he
had been out on parole should be deducted from the remainder
of his sentence and that such allowance plus the benefit of the
three-fourths law,81 less good time, entitled him to a discharge
sometime before he filed his petition for the writ. The court re-
jected this contention, stating, among other things, that "no
statute has been cited which provides that the time during which
a convict is at large under a parole by the governor shall be
deducted from his sentence, in case such parole is revoked, nor
is there any statute providing that such time shall not be de-
ducted from such term of imprisonment. The governor was
therefore free to impose his own conditions,"'8 2 and the penalty
75. Mo. Const. 1875, Art. V, §8.
76. R. S. Mo. 1989 §4188.
77. Jacobs v. Crawford (1925) 808 Mo. 302, 272 S. W. 931.
78. Ex parte Mounce (1925) 307 Mo. 40, 269 S. W. 385; Jacobs v. Craw-
ford (1925) 308 Mo. 302, 272 S. W. 931; Ex parte Strauss (Mo. 1928) T
S. W. (2d) 1000, Ex parte Webbe (Mo. 1929) 30 S. W. (2d) 612.
79. Ex parte Webbe (Mo. 1929) 30 S. W. (2d) 612.
80. Jacobs v. Crawford (1925) 308 Mo. 302, 272 S. W. 931.
81. See note 172, infra for further discussion of this law.
82. Jacobs v. Crawford (1925) 808 Mo. 302, 272 S. W. 931.
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for failure to observe the conditions of the parole was that the
convict should serve the remainder of his sentence.A3 The court,
also has sustained as neither illegal, immoral, nor impossible of
performance, the condition that the prisoner depart from and
remain continuously outside of Cole County. Having voluntarily
accepted the commutation with this condition a part of it, he
could avail himself of its intended privilege of liberty only upon
meeting the conditions prescribed therein.84 In this connection,",
it is interesting to note the view of the court where the defendant
was charged with having violated the terms of a statute5 making
it the duty of all convicts discharged from the penitentiary to
leave Jefferson City and Cole and Callaway Counties within
twenty-four hours after discharge. While the statute was de-
clared unconstitutional as a special law singling out but two of
a number of counties surrounding a great penal institution, the
character of the statute was strongly and successfully attacked
on another ground,87 which to some degree also might be urged
83. "When Governor Major paroled petitioner, it was upon the express
condition that, if petitioner failed to observe the conditions of his parole,
or the governor ordered his arrest and return to the penitentiary, petitioner
should 'serve out the remainder of his sentence.' Was such remainder a
term lessening from day to day, as petitioner continued to observe the con-
ditions of his parole while remaining at large thereunder, or was it a fixed
term? That it was intended to be a fixed term, not subject to diminution
during the existence of the parole, is apparent from the fact that it was
specified in the order granting the parole that petitioner was 'granted a
commutation of sentence for the purpose of parole, without the benefit of
the three-fourths law.' That simply meant that, without waiting for the
application of the three-fourths law, the remainder of petitioner's sentence
was conditionally commuted or wiped out as of that date. There was there-
fore no remainder of his sentence to be served, if he observed the conditions
of his parole .... "
It is apparent that the governor intended to impose as one of the condi-
tions of the parole, that the full unexpired sentence of petitioner should
hang over him as a 'Sword of Damocles' to keep him faithful to the end
of the period of grace. If the unexpired sentence conditionally commuted
lessens from day to day while a paroled convict is at large under parole,
one of the very greatest inducements to persuade such convict to remain a
law abiding citizen becomes less of an inducement from day to day, and
he may arrive at a period where he will calculate supposed benefits ac-
cruing from his failure to remain a law abiding citizen against the diminish-
ing penalty for failure to live such a life." Jacobs v. Crawford, (1925)
308 Mo. 302, 272 S. W. 931, 933.
84. Ex parte Strauss (Mo. 1928) 7 S. W. (2d) 1000.
85. Ex parte Schatz (1925) 307 Mo. 67, 269 S. W. 383, 38 A. L. R. 1032.
86. R. S. Mo. 1929 §12523.
87. The statute involved placed no restrictions or limitations upon the
word "discharged" used in it. Without such, the word, stated the court,
has the meaning of being restored to freedom. It may not mean that the
prisoner has been given the right of suffrage, or the right to hold office,
if such have been taken from him by his conviction, but it does mean that
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against the legality of the gubernatorial condition that the con-
vict when paroled must depart from and remain out of Cole
County. However, the applicability of the attack to one method
of release and not to the other may be justified by the basic dif-
ference between a discharge and a parole or conditional com-
mutation.
The rules applying to conditional pardons or paroles, granted
by the governor or other constitutional pardoning power, are
equally applicable to paroles granted by the trial courts. Since
judicial paroles are also purely matters of grace or favor, when
one is accepted by the defendant, it is accepted subject to all
the conditions imposed by the court, which are not illegal, im-
moral, or impossible of performance. 8 In this connection, the
power of the court to suspend sentence or the execution of its
judgment is important. In one case the court, in effect, granted
an indefinite suspension of execution by ordering the release of
the defendant in order that he might seek a change of climate
made necessary because he was contracting tuberculosis; this
action was held to be an effort of the court to usurp the pardon-
ing power of the governor. The court, holding it invalid, stated
that in the absence of some statutory provision, the judgment
of a court imposing a jail sentence can be satisfied only by a
in all other respects he is a citizen. If before his conviction he had the
constitutional right to choose his place of abode, which he undoubtedly
possessed, then his discharge by the state would leave to him that right,
or otherwise he would not have the privilege in this respect accorded to
other citizens. Whether this man has been restored to his right to vote
and hold office, and therefore repossessed of all the privileges of a citizen,
is not the real question. His discharge so far reinstated him to the position
of a citizen that he could go from place to place within the state and
within Cole and Calloway Counties, and within the United States. For his
wrong, he had paid his penalty to the satisfaction of the state, and by the
state he has been discharged, i. e., restored to the right of selecting his
own home anywhere within the confines of the state, or within any county
therein. Other citizens of the state can live in, own property, and do busi-
ness in both Cole and Calloway Counties. Is there equal protection of the
rights of these citizens as compared with other citizens to preclude their
residing in these particular two counties? One of the things contemplated
by punishment for crime is the reformation of the citizen. Why cannot
they carry out the reformation in Cole and Calloway Counties as well as
in other counties of the State? If the discharged citizen becomes unsavory,
he can be as well tried and punished in these two counties as elsewhere.
If he does not choose to work, we have a vagrancy law of general applica-
tion. Back of all this, a discharged convict is a citizen and entitled to all
constitutional rights not taken from him. This law is wrong in funda-
mental principles, and we think clearly unconstitutional. See Ex parte
Schatz (1925) 307 Mo. 67, 269 S. W. 383.
88. See note 53, supra.
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compliance with its terms, and that, the defendant, consequently
could be returned and required to serve the rest of his sentence.,,
Again, where the court, on a plea of guilty by the defendant,
made an order that the assessing of punishment and sentence be
"deferred to some future time," and the defendant contended
that the court was without jurisdiction to assess the punishment
later when it sought to do so, the appellate court sustained this
contention." It held that withholding indefinitely the sentence
was an exercise of the pardoning power, which was lodged solely
with another department of the government. That such power in
the courts does not exist in this state, is also indicated by the
very fact that, although we have a statute regulating parole,
which is in effect a suspension of punishment, even this power
of parole cannot be exercised until there has been a judgment or
sentence. Therefore, in the light of this holding that the court
could not suspend its sentence indefinitely, it could not grant a
stay of execution "so long as the defendant remains out of the
country.""' Such a condition, would also appear to be illegal,
since this parole is actually an order of banishment.
But the legislature has attempted to vest in the courts the
power to place the defendant on probation and to suspend the
imposition or execution of his sentence if he be a person eligible
for judicial parole.92 Surely, therefore, if the legislative action
is effective, in order to award the relief naturally attending any
of these methods, the court can impose any condition that is not
illegal, immoral, or impossible of performance. The illegality of
an indefinite stay or suspension is overcome by the statute previ-
ously discussed,93 which provides for the automatic discharge of
the parolee after a specified period has expired without an abso-
lute discharge or termination being ordered by the court.
The court, or the judge thereof in vacation, is granted by
statute the discretion to parole any person against whom a fine
has been assessed or a jail sentence imposed by the court, or any
person actually confined in jail under a judgment of a justice
89. Ex parte Bugg (1912) 163 Mo. App. 44, 145 S. W. 831.
90. State v. Hockett (1908) 129 Mo. App. 639, 108 S. W. 599 (The
defendant in this case was ordered discharged as the court, by failing to
impose sentence, was held to have lost all jurisdiction). For further treat-
ment of suspension of sentence, see notes 29 to 36, supra.
91. Ex parte Thornberry (1923) 300 Mo. 661, 254 S. W. 1087.
92. R. S. Mo. 1939 §9156.
93. R. S. Mo. 1939 §4207. See note 34, supra for its provisions.
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of the peace, or sentenced to a reformatory for juvenile offend-
ers.9' Of course, this statute too is subject to the requirement
that the conditions or restrictions of the parole must not be
illegal, immoral, or impossible of performance.
There are certain statutory conditions concerning the giving
of a bond, the payment of costs, and other expenses, which the
court may or must make a condition of the parole. For instance,
one statute makes it the express duty of the trial court, where
judicial paroles are granted, before or at the time of the grant-
ing, to require the defendant, with one or more sureties, to enter
into a bond with the state in a sum to be fixed by the court, con-
ditioned that he will appear in court on the first day of each
regular term and every day during such term during the con-
tinuance of the parole, and that he shall not depart without leave
of court.95 Another statute makes it the duty of the court to
require the person paroled to pay or give security for the pay-
ment of all costs that may have accrued in the cause, unless the
person paroled is insolvent and unable either to pay or furnish
security for the same.96 A legislative enactment also requires
the parolee to appear at regular intervals before the court or the
judge who granted the parole, during the continuance of his
parole and to furnish, at the parolee's own expense, proof that,
since his parole or since the last date at which such proof had
been previously furnished, he has complied with all the condi-
tions of his release and conducted himself as a peaceable and
law-abiding citizen97
(To Be Concluded in The February Issue.)
94. R. S. Mo. 1939 §4200.
95. R. S. Mo. 1939 §4203.
96. R. S. Mo. 1939 §4208.
97. R. S. Mo. 1939 §4205.
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